The Effect of the Electoral Cycle on Legislators’ Career Strategies.

Evidence from Argentina, 1983-2007*

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Abstract (100 words)

How do electoral opportunities affect politicians’ career strategies? Do politicians behave strategically in response to the opportunities provided by the electoral calendar? We argue that in a legislature that combines nonstatic ambition with a staggered electoral calendar, different kinds of politicians will have dissimilar preferences towards running in concurrent or midterm elections. More specifically, politicians with no previous executive experience should strategically run in midterm legislative elections in order to increase their visibility among voters, while more experienced politicians should opt for concurrent elections. We support these claims with data from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies between 1983 and 2007.

Keywords: legislative careers – electoral calendar – staggered membership renewal – nonstatic ambition – Argentina
Introduction

How do electoral opportunities affect politicians’ career strategies? Do politicians behave strategically in response to the opportunities provided by the electoral calendar? In this article we explore how a scattered electoral calendar affects politicians’ career choices in a setting in which legislators show little interest in reelection. Employing a simple decision-theoretic model, we show that the combination of (a) politicians with little interest in pursuing a legislative career—nonstatic ambition—and (b) staggered membership renewal (SMR)—the fact that legislators belonging to the same body are elected at different points in time (Goetz et al. 2014)—can induce a self-selection process among ambitious politicians who differ in their underlying quality. Specifically, politicians with previous executive experience have strong incentives to run for legislative office in concurrent elections, while their less experienced peers are better off by self-selecting into midterm elections. The electoral calendar should also introduce systematic differences in behavior between different legislative cohorts: legislators elected in midterm elections should submit fewer bills—they have to spend more time campaigning—and be more likely to seek reelection upon failing to win an executive position.

By studying the interplay between the electoral calendar and politicians’ career strategies, we contribute to two different literatures. First, political careers are important in their own right because ambition lies “at the heart of politics” (Schlesinger 1966) and therefore politicians’ career choices can affect a variety of outcomes, including the delivery of local goods (Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1977; Ames 2001), party discipline (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Treul 2009), bill drafting (Van der Silk and Pernacciaro 1979; Schiller 1995; Crisp, Kanthak, and Leijonhufvud 2004; Micozzi 2013), cosponsorship decisions (Crisp et al. 2004; Micozzi 2014a), and how frequently legislators visit their home districts (Crisp and Desposato 2004). Moreover, politicians’ decisions to seek reelection or retire also affect voters’ chances of rewarding or
punishing incumbents in the voting booth (Powell 2000), and legislators are more likely to create professionalized legislatures and invest in policy-making skills if they have long time horizons (Squire 1988; Squire 1998; Weingast and Marshall 1988).

Second, we extend the existing literature on the effect of the staggered electoral calendar on political outcomes. Recent studies have shown that the electoral calendar affects the incidence of electoral fraud (Fukumoto and Horiuchi 2011), shapes legislators’ time horizons (Dal Bó and Rossi 2011; Goetz et al. 2014; Fukumoto and Matsuo forthcoming; Titiunik forthcoming) and influences the allocation of funds between states (Shepsle et al. 2009) as well as the cohesiveness of state delegations in the national legislature (Rosas and Langston 2011). These contributions trace the path of a growing research agenda, as SMR is a feature of more than 15 upper houses around the world,1 as well as the Argentine Chamber of Deputies and several subnational legislatures in Argentina and the U.S. However, existing research has focused on the effect of the electoral calendar on legislators’ behavior; the possibility that SMR might also affect politicians’ career strategies has received little consideration.2 This article fills this gap by presenting a novel theoretical argument that links the electoral calendar to career decisions and legislative behavior, and providing systematic evidence in favor of its implications.

In this respect, it is worth noting that the Argentine electoral calendar can be treated as exogenous. Thus, our article joins a growing literature that studies the impact of exogenous institutional rules on political decisions. In a landmark contribution, Cox and Katz (2002) explain how the reapportionment revolution changed incumbents’ decisions regarding whether to run for reelection or retiring. The introduction of direct elections for the U.S. Senate modified trends in cohesion and pursuit of reelection (Bernhard and Sala 2006), bill drafting (Schiller 1995), responsiveness to voters (Gailmard and Jenkins 2009), and moderation of voting decisions’ policy space (Patty 2008). The adoption of primaries was also a major institutional decision that
modified the strength of parties and local bosses (Ansolabehere et al. 2006). Similarly, term limits affect patterns of responsiveness (Taylor 1992), the development of personal connections with voters (Carey 1998), and future career choices (Langston and Aparicio 2009).

To summarize our argument, we claim that the combination of SMR with nonstatic ambition may lead different kinds of politicians to pursue distinctive career paths, shaping their behavior accordingly. The argument is divided in two parts. First, we argue that in a setting that combines SMR with nonstatic ambition, different kinds of politicians will have different incentives to run in concurrent or midterm elections. When (subnational) executive positions are more valuable than (national) legislative ones, becoming known among a large group of voters is essential for developing a successful executive career. High-quality politicians—those with previous executive experience—can obtain a good position in the party list in any election. Since they run for legislative office when executive term limits kick in, they will opt to run in concurrent elections in order to increase their media exposure and maximize the expected rents from legislative office. This leaves low-quality politicians with the choice of running in a mid-level position in the party list in a concurrent election, or in a higher-level one in a midterm contest. Given these options, some of them will find that getting a good position in the party list in a midterm is the best way of maximizing their visibility and name recognition. That is, these low-quality politicians self-select into midterm elections not because midterms are more attractive in an absolute sense, but to avoid competing against their high-quality peers in concurrent elections.

Second, we claim that the incentives provided by the electoral calendar should affect legislators’ behavior in office. To the extent that campaigning detracts from legislative activity (Fukumoto and Matsuo forthcoming; Titiunik forthcoming), legislators elected in midterm elections should spend more time campaigning for an executive position, and thus should submit fewer bills than their peers. Furthermore, legislators elected in midterm elections who lose an
executive election halfway through their term should have higher reelection rates: although they do not want to develop a legislative career—and they signal it by running for an executive position—the fact that their mandate ends in a midterm year means that they have no better alternative than seeking a new term.

We examine these claims with data on the Argentine Chamber of Deputies between 1983 and 2007. In line with expectations, our results indicate that politicians with previous executive experience do self-select into concurrent legislative elections. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is substantial: the proportion of high-quality politicians hovers around 0.33 in concurrent cohorts, but decreases to 0.21 in midterm cohorts. The results also show that legislators elected in midterm years submit fewer bills during the first half of their mandate and are more likely to seek reelection, but this effect is conditional on having lost an executive election. This is consistent with the claim that legislators with limited executive experience use midterms as “springboards” from which to run for more attractive offices.

The rest of this article is organized as follows. The next section presents our argument and hypotheses. We then explain why the Argentine Chamber of Deputies provides an ideal scenario for testing these hypotheses, and introduce our research design and variables. The following section presents the results. The final section concludes.

The Argument

Overview

We claim that the combination of SMR with nonstatic ambition should have two kinds of effects. First, the selection effect implies that low-quality politicians should run for legislative office in midterm elections in order to increase their visibility among voters. Note the conditional nature of this statement: the point is not that running in a midterm is preferable in an absolute sense, but
rather that for a certain kind of politician running in a midterm is the best of available alternatives. Intuitively, if high-quality politicians monopolize the most desirable candidacies in concurrent elections, their low-quality peers will have a better chance of getting known by running in a midterm. Second, the behavior effect suggests that legislators elected in different years should behave in systematically different ways, especially with regard to bill submission and their willingness to seek reelection. The rest of this section summarizes the central assumptions behind the argument, illustrate its plausibility with the help of a simple decision-theoretic model, and discuss the hypotheses that follow from it.

Assumptions

Our argument is built upon one assumption and two distinctions. First, we assume a setting where politicians prefer executive positions to legislative ones, even if the former are at the subnational level (governorships, mayoralities) while the later are national in nature (a congressional seat). That is, we are interested in political behavior in a setting characterized by nonstatic ambition (Schlesinger 1966; Squire 1988): given the chance, legislators prefer to “jump” to an executive position rather than continuing in the legislature. This is common in several Latin American countries, notably Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay (Power 2000; Ames 2001; Samuels 2003; Jones et al. 2002; Cunow et al. 2012; Pereira and Rennó 2013; Chasquetti and Micozzi 2014; Micozzi 2014a; Micozzi 2014b).

Of course, nonstatic ambition does not mean that legislative positions are without value. For some politicians, a national legislative position can serve as a “springboard” from which to seek an executive position in the future, especially if they head a party list that does well at the polls. Other offices—like a ministerial position at the subnational level—may be more valuable in certain circumstances, but they are also subject to their own constraints; in particular, ministers
serve at the governor’s discretion, and opposition politicians are unlikely to receive a ministerial appointment. Moreover, a seat in the national legislature offers some valuable rents—a large salary, travel perks, and access to some patronage jobs—for executives facing term limits. Overall, however, these benefits pale in comparison to those offered by most executive positions.

Second, we distinguish between concurrent and midterm elections. More specifically, imagine a legislature with two features. One is that only some legislative elections are concurrent with executive elections; the others are midterm contests (see Figure 1). The other is staggered membership renewal: the legislature is renewed by fractions every election year, meaning that legislators holding office at a given point in time have been elected at different moments—as in the U.S. Senate.

**FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE**

Concurrent and midterm elections might differ in a variety of ways. In particular, the American literature has shown that the former receive more media coverage (Kernell 1978; Goldenberg and Traugott 1987) and draw more attention from voters (Nicholson 2003). We are not aware of similar studies for other countries, though it would be unsurprising to find that a similar logic holds outside the U.S. However, what is valid for the election as a whole need not apply to individual candidates contesting such elections. If media coverage is disproportionately concentrated on executive candidates, politicians running for a legislative position might expect to receive more media attention during midterms. Alternatively, concurrent elections might attract more media coverage simply because they feature stronger candidates (e.g., term-limited governors). The point is that even if concurrent elections attract more media attention than midterms, not all politicians are equally well positioned to take advantage of this fact.

Third, we distinguish between “high-quality” and “low-quality” politicians. Since we are interested in politicians’ capacity to win elections, we employ the term “quality” to capture all
those factors that make some candidates more competitive than others: media visibility, charisma, fundraising abilities, or control over patronage networks. Thus, we follow the dominant approach in the literature and conceptualize quality in terms of previous (executive) experience.\(^5\)

Specifically, we assume that the probability that a politician is of high quality at time \(t\) is increasing on the number, relevance and visibility of her electoral and government performance up to time \(t-1\): former governors and mayors of large cities are likely to be of higher quality than former legislators, who in turn are likely to be of higher quality than politicians who never held an elected position before. By separating a politician’s quality from her inherent personal traits (such as charisma), this approach allows for the possibility that an individual’s quality might change over time. For example, seasoned politicians should be of higher quality than rookies, and high-level officials who make egregious mistakes can see their popularity plummet.

\[A \text{ decision-theoretic model of politicians’ career choices}\]

In this section we formalize our claims with the help of a simple decision-theoretic model. There are three time periods. At \(t=0\) and \(t=2\), legislative and executive elections are concurrent, while \(t=1\) indicates the date of a midterm legislative election (see Figure 1). All mandates last for up to two terms, \(i.e.\) candidates elected at \(t\) can keep their office until \(t+2\), though they might resign beforehand. Legislators are elected via closed-list PR in multi-member districts that are coterminous with executive constituencies. Thus, getting a top position in the party list increases both the probability of winning a seat and the chances of becoming known among voters.

\(P\) is a politician making a choice about her future career path. We assume that \(P\) is not running for executive office at \(t=0\), either because she is term-limited or because she failed to receive her party’s nomination.\(^6\) That is, before the next executive election takes place at \(t=2\), \(P\) can only run for a legislative position, but she must choose between running at \(t=0\) or waiting.
unl $t=1$. In either case, she wins a seat with probability $\pi_t(\theta_q) \in (0,1)$, where $\theta_q$ indicates $P$’s quality. As explained above, “quality” captures all those factors that increase a politician’s chance of winning an election. Formally, a politician’s quality is indexed by $q \in \{0, 1, 2\ldots\}$, with higher values indicating more qualified individuals. Thus, $\theta_0$ indicates a low-quality politicians, while $\theta_1$, $\theta_2$, etc., indicate increasingly influential ones. Quite naturally, the probability of getting elected is increasing in quality, i.e. $\partial \pi(\cdot) / \partial \theta_q > 0$.

If $P$ does not run for a legislative position, or runs and loses, her political career is over and the game ends. In that case her utility is normalized to 0. If she wins a seat, she receives a payment of $\frac{1}{2}R_L > 0$ for every time period she spends in office. Furthermore, she may experience an increase in quality if her list does well in the election and she receives enough media coverage. We formalize this with the parameter $\lambda_t \in (0,1)$, which indicates the probability that $P$’s quality will increase following election $t$. As mentioned above, whether $\lambda_t$ is higher in concurrent or midterm elections depends on several factors, notably $P$’s capacity to get a top spot in the party list and do well in the election: although concurrent elections receive more media coverage, this attention may be concentrated in candidates other than $P$.

Finally, at $t=2$, $P$ has the chance of running for an executive office. Executive positions are more valuable than legislative ones, and thus the per-period rent from an executive office is $\frac{1}{2}R_E > \frac{1}{2}R_L$. The probability of winning an executive election is $\pi_E(\theta_q, S_l)$, where $S_l$ indicates the amount of work $P$ did on behalf of her constituents, for example by sponsoring legislation, and $l \in \{1, 2\}$ is the number of periods she spent in the legislature. Quite naturally, we assume that $\pi_E(\cdot)$ is increasing in both $\theta_q$ and $S_l$, as well as $S_2 > S_1$. Lastly, note that if $P$ had been elected to the legislature at $t=0$, her mandate ends at $t=2$, and thus she must choose between seeking
reelection and running for an executive position; but if she was elected in a midterm, her mandate ends at $t=3$, and thus she can keep her seat in case of losing an executive election.

Implications (1): Selection effects

$P$ must choose between running in a concurrent ($t=0$) or a midterm election (at $t=1$). This opens the possibility that high-quality politicians may optimize differently from low-quality ones. To see this, let $R_E$ be large enough that $P$ always wants to run for an executive position if given the chance, and compare her expected utility from running in a concurrent or a midterm election:

$$
E[U_P | \text{concurrent}] = \pi_Q \left( R_L + \lambda_0 \pi_E(\theta_{q+1}, S_2) R_E + (1 - \lambda_0) \pi_E(\theta_q, S_2) R_E \right)
$$

$$
E[U_P | \text{midterm}] = \pi_Q \left( \frac{1}{2} R_L + \lambda_1 \pi_E(\theta_{q+1}, S_1) (R_E - \frac{1}{2} R_L) \right)
+ (1 - \lambda_1) \pi_E(\theta_q, S_1) (R_E - \frac{1}{2} R_L) \right).^{11}
$$

This shows that running at $t=0$ offers two advantages over running at $t=1$. Since $P$ spends more time in the legislature, the expected rents from legislative office are larger. And if $P$’s quality remains constant, getting elected at $t=0$ gives her more time to develop ties with voters, increasing her chances of capturing an executive position at $t=2$. However, these utilities also imply that if $\lambda_1 - \lambda_0 > 0$ and the magnitude of this difference is large enough, $P$ will maximize her expected utility by running in a midterm.$^{12}$

As discussed above, this is unlikely to be the case for high-quality politicians, because they can receive a top position in the party list in any kind of election, and thus may benefit from higher media coverage in concurrent elections. Moreover, to the extent that such politicians are relatively well known to voters, they should put more emphasis on the other benefits of running in concurrent elections, such as higher rents from office and extra time to develop ties with voters. But low-quality politicians are in a different situation. If their high-quality peers monopolize the best positions in the party list, their choice is not between a highly visible
position in a concurrent election and a highly visible one in a midterm, but rather between a mid-tier position in a concurrent election and a more visible one in a midterm. Similarly, to the extent that getting known among voters is more important than sponsoring legislation, low-quality politicians will be willing to give up time in the legislature in return for a chance of increasing their quality. The point is not that midterm elections are more attractive \textit{per se}, but rather that for low-quality politicians the odds of getting a good position in the party list are higher in midterms. Nor are we saying that the strategy of running in a midterm in order to increase one’s name recognition is likely to be successful; rather, our claim is that if high-quality politicians monopolize the best candidacies in concurrent elections, their low-quality peers might find that their best choice is to run in a midterm.\textsuperscript{13}

This suggests two implications about the distribution of high-quality politicians between different cohorts. First, the proportion of high-quality \textit{candidates} should be lower in midterm elections. Second, under the mild assumption that—conditional on getting a spot in the party list—high-quality politicians are equally likely to win a seat in a concurrent or a midterm election, midterm cohorts should feature a lower proportion of high-quality \textit{legislators}. This leads to the following hypothesis:

\hspace{1cm} \textbf{H}1. \textit{Self-selection}. The proportion of high-quality politicians should be lower among (a) candidates running in midterm elections and (b) legislators belonging to midterm cohorts.

\textit{Implications (2): Behavior in office}

The model also has some implications about the behavior of legislators belonging to different cohorts, which we call “midterm legislators” and “concurrent legislators”. First consider the parameter $S_l$, which captures the extent to which politicians establish ties with voters by sponsoring legislation. Although all legislators should want to sponsor as many bills as possible,
those elected in concurrent elections will be in a better position to do it. On the one hand, they can engage in this kind of behavior during their entire term, while their midterm peers can only do it during the first half of their term. On the other, concurrent legislators only have to campaign for an executive office at the end of their term, while their peers must run halfway through their mandate. Since campaigning often detracts time from other activities, like sponsoring legislation or making speeches (Titiunik forthcoming; Fukumoto and Matsuo forthcoming), midterm legislators should sponsor fewer bills even during the first half of their term. Thus,

\[ H_2. \text{ Bill submission.} \] Midterm legislators should sponsor fewer bills both (a) in the first half of their mandate and (b) during their entire term in office.

Second, different kinds of legislators should have different reelection rates, but this effect should be limited to those individuals who ran for an executive position and lost. Consider \( P \)’s situation at \( t=2 \). If she was elected at \( t=0 \), she must choose between seeking reelection and running for an executive office. Thus, if she runs for an executive position and loses, she will be left with nothing. But if she was elected at \( t=1 \), she can run for an executive office knowing that in case of losing she will retain her seat until \( t=3 \). In that case, \( P \) will have strong incentives to run for reelection at the end of her term: since her mandate ends in a midterm year, reelection can be a valuable consolation prize. In other words, while concurrent legislators face a choice regarding what office to run for, their midterm peers can run for an executive office halfway through their mandate and seek reelection if they are unsuccessful.

An alternative way of saying this is the following. Legislators’ (lack of) interest in reelection reflects a variety of motives. Some decide to retire from politics due to health or family issues. Others realize that politics is not their vocation after all. Alternatively, some might decide to pursue a long-term legislative career. Yet we see no reason why legislators elected in concurrent
or midterm elections should differ systematically in these respects. Then there are those legislators who pursue reelection as a “consolation prize”, simply because they have nothing better to do. This group includes both (a) those individuals that failed to get a nomination for a better office, and (b) those that received a nomination but lost the election. The former should simply seek reelection at the end of their term, and thus we should see no difference between concurrent and midterm legislators. But among the latter, those who were elected in a concurrent election have to run for an executive position at the end of their term, and thus miss the chance of seeking reelection in case of losing; while their midterm peers keep their legislative seat and thus can pursue reelection as a consolation prize. That is, differences in reelection rates between cohorts should be limited to those legislators who lost an executive election:

\[ H_3. \text{Reelection}. \] Midterm legislators who run for an executive position and lose should be more likely to run for reelection at the end of their term.

**Data and methods**

*Case selection*

We examine these claims with data from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies between 1983 and 2007. We focus on this case because the rules of the game are broadly consistent with the stylized facts of our model. First, Argentine legislators are more interested in obtaining an executive position at the subnational level—like a governorship or a mayoralty—than in pursuing a legislative career (Jones 2002; Jones et al. 2002; Micozzi 2014a, 2014b). Indeed, Argentine governors—and to a lesser extent, mayors of large cities—enjoy wide public visibility, administer abundant financial resources (Gervasoni 2010; Bonvecchi and Lodola 2011) and control large political machines (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002; Calvo and Murillo 2004, 2005;
Leiras 2006; Jones 2008; Lodola 2009). Nonetheless, most governors and mayors are subject to term limits, which force them to run for a legislative office from time to time.

Second, Argentine deputies last four years in office but the Chamber is renewed by halves every two years, with each province renewing half of its legislative delegation every two years. Since subnational executives last four years in office, this creates a pattern in which concurrent executive and legislative elections are followed by midterm legislative elections, and vice versa (see Figure 2).

**FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE**

Third, these rules can be treated as exogenous. The staggered electoral calendar was first introduced in the 1853 constitution, and the issue has received little attention since then. Argentina experienced multiple military coups during the twentieth century, but most military governments reinstated the 1853 constitution before leaving power. The 1994 constituent assembly could have changed the electoral calendar but chose to focus on other issues, like the relaxation of presidential term limits, the elimination of the electoral college, or the direct election of the Senate. Provincial legislatures may also change the electoral calendar, as they enjoy a wide degree of autonomy for designing subnational institutions. Indeed, since 1983 some provinces have established (or eliminated) midterm elections for provincial legislators. Nonetheless, with the exception of Corrientes (where senators have 6-year terms), all subnational officials last 4 years in office, and provincial politicians have shown more interest in changing the rules for electing provincial legislators (Calvo and Micozzi 2005) or relaxing executive term limits (Lucardi and Almaraz 2015) than in modifying the term lengths of subnational executives.

Finally, other features of the Argentine political system are consistent with our argument. Argentina is a federal country divided into 24 provinces, and with the exception of the national presidency, all elections take place at the provincial level or below. National deputies are elected
using proportional representation in multi-member districts that are coterminous with provincial boundaries, meaning that national deputies are elected by the same electorate that chooses the provincial governor. The use of closed lists and the fact that candidate names appear in the ballot means that higher-placed candidates are more visible to voters, especially when there are no executive elections. And legislators are not required to resign in order to run for another office, though no politician can hold two elected positions at the same time.

Only two features of the Argentine political system are potentially problematic for our argument. First, high party discipline means that legislators cannot differentiate themselves on the basis of their individual voting patterns (Jones and Hwang 2005; Jones, Hwang, and Micozzi 2009). And second, the use of closed-list PR means that candidate nominations for national legislative positions are decided by (provincial) party organizations rather than individual politicians (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002). Nonetheless, these issues are less serious than they appear at first sight. Party discipline does not prevent legislators from trying to increase their visibility among voters and fellow copartisans by sponsoring legislation (Micozzi 2013, 2014a, 2014b); if anything, the fact that legislators cannot differentiate themselves through their voting records increases the relative value of bill sponsorship. And candidate nominations are decided either in intraparty primaries or through informal negotiations between party bigwigs (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002). In either case, politicians holding elected positions—governors, mayors of large cities, senators and some national deputies—will have a stronger influence on the outcome. The point is that individual politicians do have some room to advance their candidacies, especially if they can show strong connections with voters. Moreover, the fact that party bigwigs exert more influence in the nomination process only reinforces our claim that high-quality politicians monopolize the best candidacies in concurrent elections.
Samples

We collected data on all Argentine deputies elected between 1983 and 2003, thus finishing their mandate between 1985 and 2007. We used this data to construct two samples. The main sample includes all legislators elected between 1985 and 2003. We exclude the members of the 1983 class because strictly speaking our argument does not apply to them. Since these were the first elections after the return to democracy, all legislators were elected at the same time, with half of them being randomly assigned to a 2-year mandate instead of a 4-year one. That is, self-selection was not possible, and legislators whose mandate ended in a midterm year could not run for an executive office before the end of their term.

Nonetheless, the randomization of term lengths implies that among the members of the 1983 class, receiving a mandate that ended in a concurrent or a midterm year should be orthogonal to quality. Thus, in some specifications we will employ the 1983 sample to examine the last two hypotheses, which predict differences in behavior among members of different legislative cohorts that are not based on quality. If legislators whose mandate ends in a midterm year are more likely to seek reelection because they have no better thing to do, the reelection hypothesis predicts that legislators who received a 2-year mandate should have higher reelection rates, as there were no executive elections in 1985. Moreover, to the extent that this forced them to begin campaigning early, the second hypothesis predicts that they should have sponsored fewer bills during their first two years in office.

In both samples, the unit of observation is the individual legislator. This merits a clarification. Since we only have data on elected legislators, we cannot examine the first part of the self-selection hypothesis, which says that midterm elections should feature fewer candidates with previous executive experience. But this should not be a major problem, because conditional on getting a position in the party list, high-quality politicians should not be less likely to win a seat
in a midterm election; after all, these politicians often belong to major parties and can get the most desirable positions in the party list. We also restricted the samples in three ways. First, we only include legislators who were serving their first term in office; since we expect that some midterm legislators will have higher reelection rates, counting them twice might bias the results. Second, we excluded legislators from the City of Buenos Aires, which does not hold municipal elections. Finally, we limited the sample to legislators who began a new mandate, *i.e.* we excluded those that replaced a colleague that died or resigned.\(^{20}\)

*Variables and data*

The main explanatory variable is *Midterm*, a dummy indicating whether a legislator’s mandate was scheduled to end in a year in which there were no subnational executive elections in her home province. Except for legislators elected in 1983, this means that the mandate in question also began in a midterm year. For post-1983 legislators, *Midterm* takes the value of 1 for individuals elected in 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997 or 2001, and 0 for those elected in 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999 or 2003 (see Figure 2).\(^{21}\) The other explanatory variable is *Lost election*, a dummy that equals 1 if a legislator lost an election for governor, vice-governor or mayor within four years of beginning her mandate. Approximately 14% of freshman legislators lost an executive election during their first term in office, a low success rate considering that only 18% of them ran for an executive position.\(^{22}\)

The dependent variables are the following. *Former executive* is a dummy indicating whether the legislator held an elected subnational executive office (governor, vice-governor or mayor) in the past. Some executive positions are more relevant than others, so in some specifications we distinguish between provincial executives (governors and vice-governors) and municipal ones (mayors). Alternatively, *Former executive* \((W)\) and *Former executive* \((W^2)\) assign different
weights to different offices. The former gives former governors a weight of 1, former vice-
governors a weight of 0.5, and weights former mayors according to their municipality’s share of
the provincial population.\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Former executive (}W^2\textit{)} takes the square of these values, thus
weighting former governors much more heavily. Approximately 18\% of freshman deputies were
former executives, most of them mayors.

For the second hypothesis, the main outcome of interest is \textit{Bills submitted}, a count of the total
number of bills—laws, resolutions and declarations—sponsored by the legislator. We distinguish
between the total number of bills submitted during a legislator’s mandate and those submitted
during her first two years in office. Additionally, in some specifications we restrict the analysis to
those bills that targeted the legislator’s home province or municipality, which tend to be
submitted by more ambitious legislators (Micozzi 2014b).\textsuperscript{24} Finally, \textit{Reelection} indicates whether
the legislator sought reelection at the end of her term. Only 25\% of legislators in the sample
sought a new mandate; of these, 72\% (18\% of the sample) were effectively \textit{Reelected}.

We also employ the following controls. \textit{Female} is a dummy that identifies women legislators.
Existing research on the Argentine Congress underscores gender-based differences in behavior
(Htun, Lacalle, and Micozzi 2013) and political experience (Franceschet and Piscopo 2014).\textit{Magnitude}
indicates the size of the district in which the legislator was elected; since provinces
elect half of their representatives in concurrent and midterm elections, this variable is (almost)
perfectly collinear with a province’s \textit{Delegation size}.\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Committee chair} identifies legislators who
presided a legislative committee during their mandate. \textit{PJ bloc} and \textit{UCR bloc} are dummies
indicating whether the legislator was affiliated with the legislative caucus of any of Argentina’s
two main parties, the \textit{Partido Justicialista} (PJ) and the \textit{Unión Cívica Radical} (UCR).
Results

Table 1 presents the results for the self-selection hypothesis. The first three columns report logit estimates of the effect of *Midterm* on *Former executive*, with standard errors clustered by province. In line with expectations, the point estimates for *Midterm* have a negative sign and are reliably estimated, even after including controls for gender, district magnitude (logged), and party identity. Although some of these variables have an independent effect on the outcome—female legislators have less executive experience, and the effect of district magnitude is negative—neither of them affect either the magnitude or the reliability of the point estimates for *Midterm*.

**TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE**

Models 1.4 to 1.6 replicate model 1.3 but employing different measures of the dependent variable: former governors only, former governors or vice-governors, and former mayors only. The effect of *Midterm* seems to be stronger in the case of former (vice-)governors—which makes sense because these politicians are likely to be of higher quality—but the estimates are negative and reliably estimated in all specifications. Models 1.7 to 1.9 show that the negative effect of *Midterm* persists if former executives are weighted according to the relevance of their previous office. Since the dependent variable is no longer dichotomous, we fit OLS models with clustered standard errors, but the negative estimate for *Midterm* remains.

To get an idea about the substantive significance of these findings, Figure 3a plots the predicted probability and 95% confidence interval that a modal legislator serving his first term in office will have prior executive experience, depending on whether he was elected in a midterm or a concurrent election. The selection effect is far from trivial: the probability that a modal legislator will have prior executive experience is 0.33 [C.I.: 0.27:0.40] if he was elected in a concurrent year, but decreases to 0.21 [C.I.: 0.17:0.26] for midterm legislators. In other words, in
concurrent cohorts 1 in 3 modal legislators have prior executive experience, but among midterm cohorts this proportion decreases to 1 in 5.

**FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE**

Table 2a presents negative binomial estimates of the effect of Midterm on the number of bills submitted by a legislator. In the first three columns the focus is on the number of bills submitted during the first two years of a legislator’s term. In line with the claim that campaigning detracts from legislative activity, the point estimates for Midterm are negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 level, regardless of whether we look at all bills or those that targeted the legislator’s home province or municipality. Models 2.4 to 2.6 show that extending the analysis to the number of bills submitted by a legislator during her entire term leads to similar results, though these numbers are somewhat suspect because of attrition among legislators who resigned. Finally, and in line with the findings of Dal Bó and Rossi (2011), legislators belonging to the 1983 class who received a 2-year mandate submitted both fewer bills and fewer provincially targeted bills than their peers. These results do not extend to municipality targeted bills, probably because of their rarity; the average legislator submitted just 0.71 of them during her first two years in office.

**TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE**

Figure 3b plots the predicted number of bills submitted by a modal legislator during his first two years in office, depending on whether he was elected in a concurrent or a midterm election. Midterm legislators submit approximately 4 fewer bills than their peers (25.0 [C.I.: 21.2:29.5] vs. 28.8 [C.I.: 24.0:34.1]), a 13% decrease. If we restrict the analysis to bills targeting the legislator’s home province, the expected difference is of 1.4 bills (6.6 [C.I.: 5.1:8.4] vs. 8.0 [C.I.: 6.0:10.2]), a 17% reduction. These numbers are larger for members of the 1983 class, with decreases of 29% and 31% respectively.
Finally, Table 2b presents the results for the reelection hypothesis. The dependent variable is again dichotomous, so we employ logit specifications with standard errors clustered by province. Model 3.1 shows that midterm legislators have somewhat higher reelection rates, but the estimate is small and not reliable. Models 3.2 and 3.3 indicate that the effect is restricted to legislators who lost an executive election: concurrent legislators and midterm legislators who did not lose an election have the same reelection rates, but midterm legislators who lost an executive contest are much more likely to seek reelection. In both cases, the coefficient for the interaction term is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. The next two columns indicate that the effect seems to be driven by legislators who lost an election for the (vice-)governorship rather than by those who failed to become mayors. This makes sense, as (vice-)gubernatorial candidates should be more likely to obtain a position in the party list upon losing. Models 3.6 and 3.7 show that the results are roughly similar if we examine whether a legislator was effectively Reelected. Lastly, models 3.8 and 3.9 restrict the analysis to the 1983 sample. In this case we cannot evaluate the reelection hypothesis because those legislators who received a 2-year mandate had no prior opportunity to run for executive office. Nonetheless, the “consolation prize” logic should still apply, as legislators who finished their mandate in 1985 had nothing better to do than running for reelection at the end of their term. In line with these expectations, the point estimates for Midterm are positive and statistically significant at the 0.10 level.

Figure 3c plots the predicted probabilities (along with 95% confidence intervals) that a modal legislator will seek reelection under different scenarios. The combined effect of being elected in a midterm and losing an executive election is immediately evident: the baseline probability of seeking reelection hovers around 0.24 [95% C.I.s: 0.13:0.35], but among midterm legislators who lost an executive election within four years of beginning their mandate this number increases to 0.43 [C.I.: 0.31:0.54]. This provides strong evidence for the claim that some ambitious legislators
treated reelection as “consolation prize”: by running for executive office halfway through their mandate, they sent a strong signal that they did not wish to develop a legislative career; and yet upon losing, they were much more likely to seek an additional term than their peers.

Conclusion

Staggered membership renewal has received substantial attention recently (Shepsle et al. 2009, Dal Bó and Rossi 2011, Rosas and Langston 2011, Goetz et al. 2014, Fukumoto and Matsuo forthcoming, Titiunik forthcoming), but so far the focus has been on how the electoral calendar affects politicians’ behavior inside the legislature. In this article we extend this literature to show that a staggered electoral calendar can also affect politicians’ career strategies. Employing a simple decision-theoretic model, we argue that high-quality candidates should prefer to run in concurrent elections, and this should induce their low-quality peers to run in midterms in order to maximize their media visibility and name recognition. The argument also suggests that since legislators elected at different moments in time face different constraints for continuing their political careers, their behavior in office should vary. In particular, midterm legislators should submit fewer bills during the first half of their term—they have to spend more time campaigning—and be more likely to seek reelection, but this second effect should be conditional on having lost an executive election in the past. The behavior of Argentine deputies is consistent with these expectations. First, legislators elected in midterm years are much less likely to have prior executive experience. Second, these legislators sponsor fewer bills during their first two years in office. And finally, midterm legislators who failed to win an executive election halfway through their mandate ran for reelection more often than their peers.

In the remainder of this section, we discuss some of the implications of our findings for legislative studies more generally, and suggest some potential directions for future research. With
respect to the first point, we stress the importance of understanding legislators’ alternatives. Even when a legislative seat is not particularly valuable, reelection rates might be relatively high if legislators have little chance of obtaining a better office, as is the case in Brazil (Cunow et al. 2012; Pereira and Rennó 2013). Indeed, our results indicate that much like their Brazilian counterparts, Argentine legislators only seek reelection when they cannot afford a better alternative. This has important normative implications, as it suggests that boosting legislators’ reelection rates is not a sufficient condition for building a professionalized legislature: what really matters is that legislators want to develop a legislative career, which is a higher bar to achieve.

This article also suggests two avenues for extending current research on the effects of the electoral calendar. One possibility is to relax the assumption that nomination decisions are made at the individual level and incorporate parties into the analysis. Existing research focuses on how parties allocate nominations between districts (Galasso and Nannicini 2011); a potential extension would be to examine how the electoral calendar affects the distribution of nominations over time, for example by looking at how the electoral calendar shapes parties’ decisions to hold primary elections (see De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002; Carey and Polga-Hecimovich 2006; Kemahlıoğlu, Weitz-Shapiro, and Hirano 2009 for recent research on the issue). A related issue is whether parties, like individuals, maximize differently depending on their electoral strength. Parties that cannot take for granted the possibility of fielding a competitive candidate in every election may be more sensitive to the opportunities provided by the electoral calendar.

Another fruitful issue for future research is to study the consequences of different electoral calendars, as well as the way they interact with each other. To begin with, note that there are two alternative ways of staggering elections. In the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, the Japanese House of Councilors and the Brazilian Senate, every district elects a fraction of its delegation in
every election year. In contrast, in the Argentine and German senates staggering is done *between districts*, that is, some districts replace their entire delegation in some election years while the remaining districts “wait” until the next election.\textsuperscript{35} This matters for two reasons.

Methodologically, only within-district staggering allows the researcher to compare legislators with different time horizons while blocking by district, as suggested by Fukumoto and Matsuo (forthcoming); if staggering is done between districts, legislators with different time horizons will necessarily belong to different districts. Theoretically, if most politicians develop their careers within a single district—which is usually the case when district boundaries coincide with large subnational units—the electoral calendar can only make a difference for career strategies if staggering is done within districts; otherwise, politicians based in the same district have no choice but to run for office at the same time, and thus a self-selection process cannot arise.

A related issue concerns the combination of different electoral calendars within the same country. Shepsle et al. (2009) show that U.S. senators adopt a particular pattern of budget appropriations that is later reversed by the House, where there is no staggering. In Argentina, the combination of staggering between districts for the Senate with staggering within districts for the Chamber suggests that selection effects should be weaker when Senate elections take place in concurrent years, because high-quality politicians will be more likely to run for a Senate seat. We cannot evaluate this claim with our data—direct elections for the Senate were only introduced in 2001—, but we hope that further research will improve our understanding of this issue.

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References


Fukumoto, Kentaro, and Akitaka Matsuo. forthcoming. “The Effects of Election Proximity on Participatory Shirking: The Staggered-Term Chamber as a Laboratory.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly*.


Figure 1. The electoral calendar in a legislature with staggered membership renewal.
Figure 2. The Argentine electoral calendar, 1983-2003. Grey boxes correspond to midterm elections, while white ones indicate concurrent elections. Legend: $P$, presidential election; $G$, gubernatorial election; $M$, mayoral election; $S_n$, election for national senators; $D_n$, election for national deputies; $S_p$, election for provincial senators (some provinces only); and $D_p$, election for provincial deputies (not necessarily all provinces).
Figure 3. Visualizing the size of the effects. Each panel reports the predicted values and 95% confidence intervals of the outcome variable for a modal legislator, under alternative values of the explanatory variable(s) of interest. Results based on models 1.3 from Table 1 and models 2.1 and 3.3 from Table 2.
### Table 1: The electoral calendar and the self-selection of politicians into legislative cohorts in Argentina, 1985-2007.

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<tr>
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<th>gov. or mayor only</th>
<th>Former executive</th>
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|                        |                |            |                   |                   |                   |                   | AIC              | BIC              | log-Likelihood   | Deviance        | \(N\)          | Specification   |
|------------------------|----------------|------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|
|                        | 786.6          | 754.7      | 751.1             | 236.9             | 334.6             | 634.4             | 743.6            | -358.6           | -489.7          |                |                |
|                        | 796.1          | 773.7      | 779.5             | 260.6             | 363.0             | 662.8             | 776.7            | -325.5           | -456.5          |                |                |
|                        | -391.3         | -373.4     | -369.5            | -113.4            | -161.3            | -311.2            | -364.8           | 186.3            | 251.8           |                |                |
|                        | 782.6          | 746.7      | 739.1             | 226.9             | 322.6             | 622.4             | 117.3            | 31.7             | 27.1            |                |                |
|                        | 842            | 842        | 842               | 842               | 842               | 842               | 842              | 842              | 842             |                |                |
| **Specification**      | logit          | logit      | logit             | logit             | logit             | logit             | logit            | logit            | logit           | OLS            | OLS            |

(*) A dummy for Female is not included because of perfect collinearity with the outcome.
(Clustered standard errors in parentheses.)
Table 2: The electoral calendar and legislative behavior in Argentina, 1983-2007.

(a) Bill submission (neg. binomial) | First 2 years | Whole term | 1983 class |
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
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(b) Relection (logit) | Lost any election | gov. | muni. | Reelected | 1983 class |
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<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
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</table>

AIC  793.4  792.9  789.4  790.5  793.6  672.6  663.6  274.5  261.4  
BIC  802.4  811.0  825.6  826.7  829.8  690.7  699.9  281.2  281.6  
log-Likelihood  -394.7  -392.4  -386.7  -387.2  -388.8  -332.3  -323.8  -135.2  -124.7  
Deviance  789.4  784.9  773.4  774.5  777.6  664.6  647.6  270.5  249.4  
N   684  684  684  684  684  687  687  216  216  

(Clustered standard errors in parentheses.)
* We thank Brian Crisp, James Spriggs, Betsy Sinclair, Margit Tavits, Andrew Reeves, Sunita Parikh, Jon Rogowski, Dawn Brancati, James Snyder, Jake Bowers, Peter Siavelis, Mihail Chiru, Jennifer Piscopo, three anonymous reviewers and audience members at Washington University in St. Louis, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and the 2014 APSA Annual Meeting for their helpful comments. Germán Lodola kindly shared his data on legislators’ reelection choices. All remaining mistakes are our entire responsibility.

1 Besides the U.S. Senate, SMR is used to elect the upper houses of Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Congo, the Czech Republic, France, Japan, Kazakhstan, Haiti, India, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan and the Philippines (see Fukumoto and Matsuo forthcoming).

2 Some recent contributions suggest implications for legislators’ future careers (see Dal Bó and Rossi 2011; Rosas and Langston 2011), but none of these authors examine them empirically.

3 A national executive position is more valuable, but few politicians can expect to win the presidency. Moreover, in presidential federations like the U.S., Brazil, Mexico or Argentina, competitive presidential candidates often have previous experience as governors.

4 In contrast, Chilean and Colombian legislators are closer to the ideal type of static ambition that characterizes the U.S. Congress.

Both possibilities are reasonable: subnational executives are often term limited, and with the exception of relatives of former politicians and highly visible outsiders, few individuals can expect to be nominated for a high-level position at the beginning of their career.

For simplicity, we assume that \( P \) cannot run twice.

In principle, a candidate’s quality may also decrease, for example if she makes an egregious mistake during the campaign. We ignore this possibility in the interest of simplicity.

Candidates running in concurrent elections might also benefit from executive coattails. This reinforces the logic that low-quality types find it harder to get noticed during concurrent elections, and thus it does not contradict our argument.

We focus on bill sponsoring because of data availability, but \( S_t \) can also represent other activities, such as providing pork or community service.

Notice that if \( P \) runs at \( t=1 \), her payoff from winning an executive election will be \( R_E - \frac{1}{2}R_L \) rather than \( R_E \) because in case of winning she has to resign from her seat.

See appendix A, available at one of the authors’ website (http://www.jpmicozzi.net/data), for a proof. The appendix also shows that including a discount term does not change the results substantially. Intuitively, regardless of whether \( P \) runs for a legislative position at \( t=0 \) or \( t=1 \), she will only be able to run for an executive position at \( t=2 \), and thus the present value of winning an executive office does not depend on whether she runs at \( t=0 \) or \( t=1 \).

This resembles Banks and Kiewiet's (1989) account of why in the U.S. weak challengers are more likely to run against incumbents: since strong challengers only enter the fray in open elections, weak challengers have little chance of winning their party’s nomination.

The exception was in 1973, when the departing military government eliminated the scattered electoral calendar (Negretto 2006: 430). However, these provisions only lasted until 1976.
The exception is the reduction in the presidential term from 6 to 4 years, which ensured that since 1995 presidential and gubernatorial elections would always take place in the same year (see Figure 2). However, the motivation goal behind this move was to shorten the presidential term, not to regularize the electoral calendar (see Negretto 2013, ch. 5).

Parties print their own ballots, and the name of top-placed candidates often appears in a larger type than that of lower-placed candidates.

The assignment followed a double-block design (by province and party identification) and was done after committee chairmanships had been allocated but before legislative sessions began in full (see Dal Bó and Rossi 2011 for details).

We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. Few members of the 1983 class had prior executive experience, but nonetheless Dal Bó and Rossi (2011) show that individuals with prior legislative experience were equally likely to receive a 2-year or a 4-year term.

Dal Bó and Rossi (2011) make the same prediction on the basis that legislators with longer time horizons can expect higher long-term payoffs from exerting effort. However, their argument also predicts that legislators who received a 4-year mandate should have higher reelection rates.

A few legislators resigned before assuming office. In such cases, we included their substitutes.

The only exception is the province of Corrientes, where political turmoil following the 1991 gubernatorial election ended up displacing the electoral calendar by two years. Thus, beginning in 1993 the coding of Midterm is reversed for legislators from Corrientes.

See Table B1 in the online appendix, available at http://www.jpmicozzi.net/data.

Legislators who held multiple positions are weighted according to the most valuable of them.
Data for these variables comes from an original database of around 177,000 bills introduced in the Chamber between 1983 and 2007, and was downloaded from the Chamber of Deputies’ website (http://www.hcdn.gob.ar/). See Micozzi (2014a, 2014b) for details.

\[ \text{Magnitude} \approx \frac{1}{2} \text{Delegation size}. \] Note that many provinces elect an odd number of deputies.

This is consistent with the findings of Franceschet and Piscopo (2014). Restricting the sample to male legislators actually strengthens the findings (results available upon request).

The exception is model 1.4, which does not include a Female dummy because of collinearity issues: no former female governor was elected to the chamber during this period.

These and other results are robust to a variety of alternative specification, including random effects, conditional logit models, adding dummies for Copartisan governor or Copartisan president, or replacing District magnitude with the province’s Delegation size. Excluding the provinces of Buenos Aires (which comprises a quarter of all observations) or Corrientes after 1993 (see fn. 21) does not change the findings either (results are available upon request).

A modal legislator is male, belongs to the PJ, and was elected in a district of magnitude 3.

Again, standard errors are clustered by province. Although we employ the same sample as in Table 1, the number of observations is lower because of missing data for the dependent variable.

These models do not include a dummy for Former executive because practically no member of the 1983 class had prior executive experience.

Again, these findings are robust to alternative specifications (results available upon request).

A modal legislator is defined in the same way as before, with the addition that he has no prior executive experience and is not a committee chairman.

Note that we excluded those legislators who died, resigned or won an executive election.

Some bodies, notably the U.S. Senate, employ a combination of both systems.